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The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
HUGH COLLINS*
Abstract: In an examination of the main provisions of Directive 2005/29, the solutions
adopted for a number of the key design issues are assessed. First, has the Directive overcome
the problem of the inherent vagueness and unpredictability of a general clause that forbids
unfair commercial practices? Second, is it the case that the Directive has no implications 
for contract law and competition law? Third, will the provisions requiring maximal har-
monisation lead to a decline in consumer protection in some Member States? Fourth, will the
new comprehensive duties to provide material information prove workable and affordable
by business? The article also assesses the degree of protection afforded to vulnerable groups,
and the extent to which the Directive will contribute towards building coherence in Euro-
pean contract law.
Résumé: L’examen des principales dispositions de la directive 2005/29 permet d’évaluer 
les solutions adoptées pour un certain nombre de questions clefs. En premier lieu, la directive
a-t-elle résolu le problème du flou et de l’imprévisibilité inhérents à une clause générale qui
prohibe les pratiques commerciales déloyales? En second lieu, est-il exact que la directive n’a
pas de conséquences sur le droit des contrats et le droit de la concurrence? En troisième lieu,
les dispositions exigeant une harmonisation maximale vont-elles conduire à un déclin de la
protection des consommateurs dans certains Etats membres? En quatrième lieu, est-ce que
les nouvelles et vastes obligations d’information seront-elles praticables et abordables dans
le milieu des affaires? L’article évalue également le degré de protection accordé aux groupes
vulnérables, et la mesure dans laquelle la directive pourra contribuer à construire une co-
hérence en droit européen des contrats. 
Kurzfassung: In dieser Untersuchung zu den wichtigsten Vorschriften der Richtlinie
2005/29 werden die Lösungen zu einer Reihe konzeptioneller Kernanliegen bewertet. Hat
die Richtlinie erstens das Problem der Unbestimmtheit und Unvorhersehbarkeit einer Ge-
neralklausel zum Verbot unfairer Handelspraktiken überwunden? Stimmt es zweitens, dass
die Richtlinie keine Auswirkungen auf Vertrags- und Wettbewerbsrecht hat? Werden drit-
tens die Bestimmungen, die eine Vollharmonisierung erfordern, zu einem Rückgang des
Verbraucherschutzniveaus in einigen Mitgliedsstaaten führen? Werden sich viertens die
neuen umfassenden Pflichten zu substantieller Information für die Praxis als praktikabel
und finanzierbar erweisen? Der Beitrag befasst sich schließlich mit dem Maß an Schutz für
schwächere Gruppen und der Frage, bis zu welchem Niveau die Richtlinie zur Kohärenz im
europäischen Vertragsrecht beitragen wird. 
The Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices was approved on 11 May
2005.1 The Commission initiated the legislative process in 2001 with a Green
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1 Dir 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the inter-
nal market and amending Council Directive 84/250/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/7/EC 
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Paper on Consumer Protection.2 The Commission explained that its aim was
to create a legislative instrument that could provide a uniform and com-
prehensive standard for governing unfair commercial practices. The instru-
ment would have as its twin objectives both to enhance the confidence of
consumers in making cross-border transactions, and to eliminate differences
in national laws that may discourage businesses from exploring the full
potential offered by the single market. Following the co-decision procedure
laid down in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, which requires the agreement of
both Council and the European Parliament, the legislative process secured
many significant amendments to and clarifications of the Commission’s orig-
inal proposal. Yet, in its essentials, the Directive has achieved the bold ambi-
tion of the Green Paper, namely to enact a mandatory general principle of
good faith to govern the practices of traders engaged in selling products and
services to consumers across all market sectors. This essay examines the cen-
tral provisions of the new Directive, which Member States are required to im-
plement by 2007.3
I. The General Principle of Good Faith
Article 5(1) of the Directive asserts that: ‘Unfair commercial practices shall be
prohibited.’ Unlike previous Directives, this pronouncement is not limited to
particular market sectors or to specific modes of communication used by
business. The principal limitation on its scope is simply that it only applies to
business to consumer commercial practices. This central provision therefore
establishes a general clause, which is likely to provoke uncertainty about the
content of the law unless the Directive contains adequate devices to pin down
its meaning.
Article 5(2) defines the meaning of ‘unfair’ by describing two criteria by
which to assess a commercial practice:
418 ERCL 4/2005
and 2002/65/EC and Regulation No 2006/2004, OJEC L 149/22 (11. 6. 2005). Except
where otherwise indicated, references in notes to Articles and Annexes are to this Direc-
tive.
2 COM(2001) 531 (2 October 2001); see also the Commission’s Follow-up Communica-
tion to the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, 11 June 2002, COM(2002) 289.
The Commission has in fact been making proposals for legislation regarding fair trading
since at least 1978: see H.-W. Micklitz, ‘A General Framework Directive on Fair Trad-
ing’, in H. Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004) 43, 44–45.
3 Dir 2005/29 Art 19 – to be precise 12 June 2007.
Hugh Coll ins
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/21/14 1:19 PM
(a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with
regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is
addressed, or of the average member of the group when a commercial practice is
directed to a particular group of consumers. 
The Directive explicates many of the terms used in that standard of unfair-
ness. 
The requirement of ‘professional diligence’ in Article 5(2)(a):
Means the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected
to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the
general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity.4
There is no further clarification of the principle of good faith. The standard of
professional diligence tries to steer a path between, on the one hand, merely
endorsing current marketing practices, which may already be unsatisfactory,
and, on the other, imposing a subjective standard in the sense that whenever a
consumer feels duped or pushed around by a trader, the conduct would be
regarded as unfair. The crucial element in constructing this middle path is the
notion of the reasonable expectation of the consumer, which permits the
court to establish an objective test by use of the standard of reasonableness.
At the same time, however, this test does not fall into the trap of merely
reflecting existing market practices, for the trader’s conduct must conform to
professional standards rather than the standards of an ordinary person, and
those standards must themselves conform to principles of good faith and
honesty. 
The second limb in Article 5(2)(b) is more closely defined. A ‘material distor-
tion’ means:
Using a commercial practice to appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to make an in-
formed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he
would not have taken otherwise.5
And the concept of a transactional decision is described broadly to include
whether, how and on what terms to purchase, pay for, retain, or dispose of a
product, including the exercise of any contractual rights.6 The concept of a
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The concept of a commercial practice itself is defined as ‘any act, omission,
course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including
advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promo-
tion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’.8 This broad definition is
likely to include any acts and omissions of a business that are calculated to
enhance the prospects of selling goods and services to a consumer. The re-
quirement of a direct connection seems to exclude traders who are only
peripherally involved in the unfair commercial practice, such as the printer
who produces a misleading document. Perhaps the most significant limita-
tion on the relevant types of commercial practice is that the conduct must be
one that is likely to ‘distort’ the economic behaviour of consumers, either by
impairing their ability to make an informed choice or by impairing their
freedom to choose. For example, a decision by a business to put poor quality
products onto the market is not an unfair commercial practice for the purpo-
ses of this Directive, but any false indications by the business that the goods
are of high quality or aggressive techniques employed to prevent consumers
from obtaining appropriate redress after sales are likely to fall within the
scope of the Directive. In a sense all advertising, whether truthful or not, is
designed to alter the economic behaviour of consumers, but it will not fall
within the scope of the Directive’s prohibition, either because it will not be
regarded as a ‘distortion’ that ‘impairs’ choice, or because the advertising
conduct is not contrary to the requirements of ‘professional diligence’.
At the heart of the Directive lies the good faith standard. When the Commis-
sion originally proposed a general standard, many reservations were express-
ed about the possible vagueness and uncertainty that such a standard might
create. The Commission argued in favour of a general standard on the ground
that businesses were always inventing new techniques for selling to consum-
ers, some of which might be unfair, and that the legislative process aimed at
sector-specific measures would always prove too slow to prevent the use of
novel unfair commercial practices unless it contained some general provision
that the courts and administrative agencies could apply. Instead of the legisla-
ture constantly playing ‘catch-up’, the Commission urged that the law should
be devised so that it could ‘catch-all’. Business interests and some govern-
ments objected that the resulting vagueness of the law would create consider-
able uncertainty about whether or not new marketing techniques were pro-
hibited. Furthermore, a general standard could be interpreted differently in
national jurisdictions, so that the alleged benefit of comprehensive and uni-




Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/21/14 1:19 PM
to trade, would be lost in the process. Instead of achieving uniformity, a Di-
rective that relied on a general clause might simply end up by provoking new
differences between national laws.9 From comparative studies of consumer
protection regimes, it could also be observed that although some countries
including the United States, Australia, and Denmark had general standards to
govern unfair commercial practices that apparently caused no great difficul-
ties for business, it was also true to say that these countries also possessed
government agencies that could provide more detailed, binding guidance on
the meaning of the general clause in particular context in order to overcome
problems of vagueness.10
The need to address this concern about the vagueness of the general standard
explains much of the subsequent detail of the Directive. We can identify three
strands in the endeavour to render the general standard more predictable.
First, the Directive contains unusually detailed definitions of its terms, includ-
ing the concept of unfairness as described above. Second, the Directive iden-
tifies two principal kinds of unfair commercial practice, namely misleading
information and aggressive commercial practices, and defines these concepts
in some detail. These two types of commercial practice, as defined, are declar-
ed to be automatically unfair.11 These two types of unfair commercial practice
do not, however, prevent the general standard from applying to other types
of commercial practice if they fall within the definition. Third, the Directive
contains in Annex 1 a list of those commercial practices which ‘shall in all
circumstances be regarded as unfair’.12 This ‘black list’ contains thirty-one
examples of prohibited commercial practices. It includes such techniques as
‘bait and switch’, false statements about the limited availability of the goods
at a particular price, and creating the false impression that the consumer has
won a prize when in fact the consumer will have to incur expenditure such as
purchase of a product to obtain the prize.13 This list is likely to provide a
valuable guide to courts and administrative authorities in their application of
the Directive and national implementing legislation, and will certainly assist
the process of harmonisation of laws at a European level. Nevertheless, these
ERCL 4/2005 421
9 G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying law Ends Up
in New Divergences’, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11.
10 For comparative studies obtained by the European Commission see research reports 
at: http:// europa.eu.int/comm./consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/green_
pap_comm./studies/index_en.htm; see also, Department of Trade and Industry, Com-
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examples of blatant unfairness will not directly assist decisions in borderline
cases of unfairness except through reasoning by analogy. In practice, it seems
likely that most contested commercial practices will fall under the heading of
two main forms of automatic unfairness: misleading practices and aggressive
practices. 
In brief, a misleading practice is described as one that contains false informa-
tion or ‘in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or likely to de-
ceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct’, and
that information relates to the nature and characteristics of the product, the
price, the nature and attributes of the trader, the legal rights of the consumer,
and the extent of the trader’s commitments, the motives for the commercial
practice and the nature of the sales process, and claims regarding sponsorship
of the trader or the product.14 This rather comprehensive list extends from
misleading price indications, such as claims that prices of goods have been
‘slashed’ (whereas in fact the price is more or less the same as before), to com-
mercial practices through which the trader pretends that no sale is envisaged
at all, as where the trader purports to be carrying out a ‘survey’ or asking
people to participate in a ‘free trial’. A misleading practice can also be com-
mitted by a misleading omission of material information,15 which raises the
topic of duties to supply information that will be considered below.
The Directive also specifies in some detail the characteristics of aggressive
commercial practices that will be regarded as automatically unfair. 
A commercial practice shall be regarded as aggressive if, in its factual context, taking
into account of all its features and circumstances, by harassment, coercion, including
the use of physical force, or undue influence, it significantly impairs or is likely to sig-
nificantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with regard to
the product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to take a transactional de-
cision that he would not have taken otherwise. 
As well as catching trading practices that use threatening language or threats
to take action that cannot be legally taken, this provision is designed to ex-
tend to more subtle techniques of coercion. For example, some traders, hav-
ing succeeded in obtaining entry to a potential customer’s home, without
making any explicit threats simply fail to leave the premises until something
has been signed, and the consumer, particularly if frail and elderly, may reach
the point of being willing to sign anything to get rid of the salesman. Another
example of harassment contained in the black list of automatically unfair
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by telephone or other remote media. Indeed the black list encourages a broad
meaning for aggressive practices by some of its examples. In particular, it
mentions two perennial problems for consumers. The first is for an insurance
business to require a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to
produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to
whether the claim was valid, or systematically to fail to respond to pertinent
correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contrac-
tual rights. Notice in this example that the aggressive practice is constituted
by an omission, namely the refusal to answer correspondence. A second prob-
lem suffered by every parent is the inclusion in advertisements of a direct
exhortation to children to persuade their parents to buy advertised products
for them. The scope of this prohibition depends crucially on the difference
between a direct and an indirect exhortation, since all advertising aimed at
children contains an indirect exhortation, even if it is disguised as a sugges-
tion to the children to ask Santa Claus for a particular present.
These three techniques for rendering the concept of unfairness more precise
and predictable will reduce, though certainly not eliminate entirely, the con-
cerns of business about the vagueness and unpredictability of a general stand-
ard. The Directive does not employ a fourth technique that was suggested,16
namely to enable Codes of Conduct established by trade associations in co-
operation with national and transnational authorities to provide more deter-
minate guidance on permitted and prohibited commercial practices. This sug-
gestion included the idea that compliance with a relevant trade code would
provide a safe haven for a business in the sense that it could not be regarded
as having committed an unfair commercial practice. Although this technique
for creating certainty is not endorsed by the Directive, the legislation does
permit national authorities to encourage trade associations to establish Codes
of Conduct, and for those trade associations to police the conduct of their
members. Even so, the national authorities must retain the power to take legal
or effective administrative action against unfair commercial practices regard-
less of whether alternative remedies may be available under a code of con-
duct.17 The Directive provides further support for codes of conduct by in-
cluding in the black list of unfair commercial practices both a claim to be a
signatory to a code of conduct when the trader is not, and a false claim that a
code has been endorsed by a public authority.18 In addition, the Directive
ERCL 4/2005 423
16 For various suggestions of this kind, see: H. Collins, ‘EC Regulation of Commercial
Practices’, in Collins, n 2 above, 1, 30; Micklitz, n 2 above, 43, 76; and G. Howells, ‘Co-
regulation’s Role in the Development of European Fair Trading Laws’, in Collins, n 2
above, 119.
17 Art 10.
18 Annex 1, paras 1 and 3.
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provides that where a trader indicates in a commercial practice that he is
bound by a code, and the trader does not comply with firm, verifiable com-
mitments contained in the code, that conduct shall be regarded as an unfair
commercial practice.19 Thus, whilst conformity to a code does not provide a
safe harbour for a trader, non-conformity to a precise obligation under a code
to which the trader has associated his business will automatically result in a
finding of an unfair commercial practice. The failure to provide any kind of
safe harbour for traders within a code does raise the possibility that traders
will decline to subscribe to codes, since their breach may result in an automa-
tic finding of unfairness, whereas membership only affords the uncertain
benefit of promoting consumer confidence.20
II. The Implications for European Contract Law
Through its broad scope and general standard the Directive plainly intro-
duces a significant control over marketing practices throughout Europe. The
obligation on Member States is to ensure that adequate and effective means
are created to combat unfair commercial practices.21 These means must in-
clude measures that enable appropriate national authorities and organisations
to bring legal or administrative procedures that will result in orders for the
cessation of unfair commercial practices.22 Furthermore, national law must
include the power for courts or administrative authorities to impose penalties
for the unfair commercial practices, and these penalties ‘must be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive’.23 With these enforcement requirements, the
Directive plainly intends Member States to create a regulatory apparatus that
uses injunctions and fines in order to prevent and deter the use of unfair com-
mercial practices. The question then arises, especially for readers of this jour-




20 Department of Trade and Industry, The European Commission’s Consultation on the
Follow-up Communication to the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection: Re-
sponse of the UK Government (London: DTI, October 2002) para 28.
21 Art 11(2).
22 Art 11(2). In addition, by Art 16, the need to provide effective enforcement measures
includes both its inclusion in the procedures for collective actions for injunctive relief
(Dir 98/27) and the duty to promote cooperation between national authorities respon-
sible for the enforcement of consumer protection law (Regulation No 2006/2004).
23 Art 13.
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On one level, there are no direct consequences for contract law. The Directive
tries to insist that it has no implications for national or European contract
law:
This Directive is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the
validity, formation or effect of a contract.24
In other words, the Directive does not require national laws to adopt a prin-
ciple that, if the formation of a contract is tainted by an unfair commercial
practice, the contract itself should be invalid or voidable. Nor does the Direc-
tive require national laws to provide compensatory remedies to the victims of
unfair commercial practices. On a formal level, therefore, the national rules
governing fraud and coercion are unaffected by the Directive. Yet we can an-
ticipate that the Directive and its implementing national legislation are likely
to have two effects on the evolution of contract law in Europe.
First, the presence of implementing legislation in the national legal system
seems likely to influence the development of private law. Where a marketing
practice has been identified as unfair under rules implementing the legisla-
tion, with the business therefore committing an administrative or criminal of-
fence, it seems likely that a court would be reluctant to refuse to permit the
consumer also to escape from the relevant transaction. The national rules of
private law governing the formation of binding contracts usually have suffi-
cient flexibility to be extended to cover these kinds of prohibited commercial
practices. In the past, however, courts may have been cautious about extend-
ing the invalidity of contracts to some of the borderline instances of unfair-
ness. For example, some representations of traders may be highly misleading,
even though not strictly speaking untruthful, and national legal systems may
have been reluctant to invalidate a transaction without evidence of a false
statement. The presence of a broad standard in consumer law may provide an
impetus for national courts to extend the concepts of private law, such as
‘culpa in contrahendo’, ‘dol par réticence’, and ‘misrepresentation’, to include
a wider range of misleading statements. 
In a similar way, the concept of an unfair commercial practice may influence
the development of compensatory remedies for those who are harmed by
such pre-contractual behaviour. Although these compensatory remedies may
be classified by national legal systems as either contractual, delictual, or some
kind of hybrid, it seems clear that the Directive is not intended to affect their
development in national law. It is possible, however, that the courts and doc-
trinal writers will be encouraged to extend their scope where necessary, so
ERCL 4/2005 425
24 Art 3(2).
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that a compensatory remedy will become normally available for loss caused
by an unfair commercial practice. In some national legal systems, private law
may evolve so far as to regard an unfair commercial practice as a type of
statutory tort or wrong, which should always give rise to a compensatory
remedy on proof of damage.
Secondly, the Directive seems likely to have a major impact on the develop-
ment of European contract law. The Directive now forms part of the acquis
communautaire, from which will be developed the ‘common frame of ref-
erence’ and other possible measures such as an ‘optional instrument’.25 Al-
though the Directive is confined to transactions between a business and a
consumer, that restriction may not be regarded as significant in the develop-
ment of general principles of contract law in Europe, since businesses them-
selves, particularly small business, often require equivalent protection against
unfair commercial practices. The Directive therefore provides strong impetus
for the development of a general principle of good faith in the context of pre-
contractual negotiations. Indeed, by referring to ‘the’ principle of good faith,
the Directive seems to presuppose that a principle of good faith is already
part of the acquis communautaire.26
The Directive also endorses other concepts that may become important
themes in the evolving European contract law. For example, it contains a de-
finition of ‘undue influence’, a term drawn from common law, but which
now has a European community meaning for the concept:
Exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply pressure, even
without using or threatening to use physical force, in a way which significantly limits
the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision.
This concept differs from the rather ill-defined common law concept of un-
due influence, which has tended to focus on situations where one party ex-
426 ERCL 4/2005
25 European Commission, A More Coherent European Contract Law: Action Plan, 12 Fe-
bruary 2003, COM(2003) 68 final, OJEC 2003 C 63/1. For discussion of these propos-
als see: M. Meli / M. R. Maugeri (eds), L’Armonizzazione Del Diritto Privato Europeo:
Il Piano D’Azione 2003 (Milano: Guiffrè, 2004); V. Roppo (ed), A European Civil
Code?: Perspective and Problems (Milano: Guiffrè, 2005); Study Group on Social Jus-
tice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: A Manifesto’,
(2004) 10 European Law Journal 653; House of Lords, ‘European Union Committee
12th Report of Session 2004–05’, European Contract Law – the Way Forward? (Lon-
don, 5/4/05) HL Paper 95.
26 In the original proposed amendment, however, the requirement of good faith was iden-
tified with the provision in the unfair terms in consumer contracts Directive 93/13:
Opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy
of the European parliament, 24 November 2003, 2003/0134(COD).
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ploits a relation of trust and confidence to its advantage. But the European
concept of undue influence could lay the foundation for more general provi-
sions concerning the use of coercion in private law. The definition, as stated,
however, does not seem entirely satisfactory for that purpose. It seems to in-
sist that this subtle form of coercion should affect the weaker party’s ability
to make an informed decision. That will often be the problem, but in some
cases of undue influence, as in my earlier example of an elderly person who
cannot get rid of a salesman without signing a document, the pressure has the
effect of reducing the freedom to choose to make a decision to enter a trans-
action at all, even if the consumer has all the correct information. Perhaps
such cases will be categorised under the concept of harassment, which is not
further defined in this Directive.
III. Relevance to Competition Law
The new Directive is often presented as a measure of consumer protection
law, though its formal legal basis was solely the internal market Treaty provi-
sion in Article 95 ECT.27 But it also has indirect implications for competition
law. Indeed, in some countries such as Germany, this topic of unfair commer-
cial practices is regarded as an integral aspect of competition rules, with the
benefits to consumers as a desirable side-effect. The reason for the overlap
between consumer protection and competition law is that unfair marketing
techniques employed by a business to increase its share of the market by dup-
ing consumers are likely to have an adverse effect on competitors. For exam-
ple, a shop in the high street that falsely claims that it has reduced its prices as
a result of a sale is likely to attract more customers, to the possible detriment
of other shops in the high street. Similarly, a business that makes its product
appear like a well-known brand may benefit from the good reputation of the
brand and divert customers away from the seller of the branded product.
Prohibition of such practices as unfair not only protects the consumer against
deception, but also protects the business that suffers from unfair competition. 
ERCL 4/2005 427
27 The preamble also refers to EC Art 153, however, which suggests that consumer pro-
tection can be regarded as an objective of the Directive for the purpose of interpretation
in the case of uncertainty about the needs of the internal market. For the limits of the le-
gal basis in Art 153, see: H.-W. Micklitz / S. Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy in the Euro-
pean Community: Before and After Maastricht’, (1993) Journal of Consumer Policy
285; J. Stuyck, ‘European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer
Policy in or Beyond the Internal Market?’, (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review
367.
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Owing to its origins as a consumer protection measure, however, the Direc-
tive does not regulate these kinds of unfair competitive practices directly. It is
necessary for the national authorities to establish that consumers would be
likely to be deceived by the practice into taking a transactional decision that
they would not otherwise have taken. It is not sufficient under this Directive
merely to demonstrate that the trader has deliberately sought to create a mis-
leading impression in order to induce customers to enter the shop. Neverthe-
less, provided that the enforcement authorities can establish that a consumer’s
transactional decision was likely to have been affected, it is an unfair com-
mercial practice for the trader to market or promote products, including the
use of comparative advertising, in a way which creates confusion with any
products, trade marks, trade names or other distinguishing marks of a com-
petitor.28 Similarly, fair competition between traders will be enhanced by the
prohibition of other kinds of misleading statements, such as false or mislead-
ing claims about the existence of a specific price advantage,29 or about the at-
tributes of the trader.30
This separation in European law between competition law and consumer
protection law may prove untenable in the long run. In the preamble to the
new Directive, Council and Parliament perhaps acknowledge as much. In a
rather unusual forward-looking statement, the preamble observes:
It is understood that there are other commercial practices which, although not harming
consumers, may hurt competitors and business customers. The Commission should
carefully examine the need for Community action in the filed of unfair competition
beyond the remit of this Directive and, if necessary, make a legislative proposal to cover
these other aspects of unfair competition.31
The purpose of this statement is no doubt to placate opposition from some
Member States such as Germany that already have an integrated approach to
competition and consumer protection, but it does suggest that it will not be
long before the Commission makes proposals to prevent unfair commercial
practices more broadly, including those relating to business to business trans-
actions.
428 ERCL 4/2005
28 Art 6(2)(a); Annex 1, para 13 in the black list also includes ‘Promoting a product similar
to a product made by a particular manufacturer in such a manner as deliberately to mis-
lead the consumer into believing that the product is made by that same manufacturer
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IV. Maximal Harmonisation
One of the principal justifications for the need for the Directive on unfair
commercial practices was the need to increase harmonisation of laws in order
to promote cross-border trade. The Commission argued that traders were
deterred from marketing their goods and services across borders for fear of
infringing local national laws. In other words, their marketing techniques,
though permitted in their country of origin, might be forbidden in the coun-
try where the traders were trying to sell directly to consumers. This legal risk,
it was alleged, deterred cross-border marketing. Assuming that this problem
does exist, there are a number of ways in which it might be addressed. 
One strategy is to adopt the ‘country of origin’ principle, which has been
used for product standards and some directives concerned with trading
standards.32 Under this principle, also known as ‘mutual recognition’, provid-
ed that a trader could demonstrate that the market practice was lawful in its
country of origin, then that market practice could be employed without in-
terference in other national jurisdictions. Support for this approach could be
found from business organisations and some national governments.33 In ef-
fect, this country of origin principle would have provided businesses with a
safe harbour against enforcement of local laws when trading abroad, provid-
ed that they could secure approval of their marketing practices in their coun-
try of origin. For example, if one country in Europe tolerated schemes in
which consumers were induced to incur expenditure by the misleading pro-
mise of prizes, every other country would have to tolerate such scams pro-
vided that the business running that operation had its main site of business in
the permissive country. This approach would certainly have overcome the
alleged obstacle to cross-border trade presented by diversity in national con-
sumer protection laws. But in so doing, it would have effectively levelled
down consumer protection against unfair commercial practices to the point
accepted by the most permissive economies.
In truth, this country of origin principle, though effective in reducing barriers
to trade and convenient for achieving political agreement in Council, has nev-
er been very attractive as a standard for harmonisation of market rules in
Europe. As well as perhaps encouraging a ‘race to the bottom’ in consumer
protection measures, a well-informed consumer living in a country with high
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levels of protection would find no reason to alter behaviour and enter trans-
actions with foreign companies for fear that the country of origin rules might
provide inferior protection. The final version of the Directive rejects the
country of origin principle, and instead imposes full harmonisation. 
Member States shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor restrict the free
movement of goods for reasons falling within the field approximated by this Directive. 
The objective of this provision is to prevent national legislatures from regulat-
ing commercial practices towards consumers in ways at variance with the
good faith standard adopted in the Directive. What the provision means is
not that Member States should not regulate this field of unfair commercial
practices, which is what it says literally, but rather that national laws should
not enact rules that differ from the principles of the Directive. In particular,
Member States are not permitted to create more stringent measures of con-
sumer protection. In other words, the Directive is an instance of maximal or
full harmonisation, rather than the normal minimum level of harmonisation
provided by most earlier consumer protection laws. 
The proposal for full harmonisation or, in view of the level of detail contained
in the Directive, almost a uniform law, provoked opposition on two grounds.
Supporters of the consumer interest were concerned that the effect of the Di-
rective might be to require national governments actually to reduce the level
of consumer protection. In particular, in those fields already harmonised by
directives setting minimum standards, the new Directive might require Mem-
ber States to adjust their legislation downwards in order to make it less re-
strictive with respect to marketing practices.34 This problem has already
emerged in connection with product liability,35 where France’s decision not to
implement a minimum threshold for the amount of damage was held to be
incompatible with the directive.36 A second ground for opposition to full
harmonisation was that the new Directive would have the effect of freezing
consumer protection laws in Europe, so that experimentation by national
governments to find new ways to protect the consumer would be inhibited
by the need to conform to the European standard.37
In response the former objection, the Directive contains a circumspect derog-
ation. Until 2013 Member States may continue to apply national provisions
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in this field of unfair commercial practices that are more restrictive or protec-
tive of consumers provided that two further conditions are met. First, the re-
strictive national legislation must be a law that implements an earlier directive
containing a minimum harmonisation clause. Second, the retained measure
must be one that is essential to ensure that consumers are adequately protect-
ed against unfair commercial practices and must be proportionate to the
attainment of this objective.38 It seems to be envisaged that the Commission
will be able to contest claims by Member States that their restrictive rules
satisfy these two conditions. If the Commission is in the mood to insist
strongly on uniform laws, it will be very hard for national governments to
defend the retention of their restrictive laws under this test. The Commission
will no doubt form the view that its unfair commercial practices directive
provides adequate protection for consumers, and that any more restrictive
regulation is a disproportionate and unnecessary interference with the opera-
tion of the single market. It is important to note, however, that as the new
Directive explicitly avoids any harmonisation of private contract law, nation-
al rules that provide compensatory remedies for consumers or the ability to
avoid contracts will not be affected by this drive for uniformity. 
The new Directive also contains some more precise exceptions to its scope
and coverage through which more restrictive national laws can be preserved.
The Directive is stated to be without prejudice to those national rules govern-
ing regulated professions that serve the purpose of upholding high standards
of integrity on the part of the professional.39 The Directive does not apply to
national rules governing the certification and indication of the standard of
fineness of articles of precious metals, such as the hallmark system for gold
and silver used in the UK. Furthermore, the Directive is stated to apply only
a minimum standard with respect to transactions in financial services and im-
movable property, so that national laws may impose requirements that are
more restrictive or prescriptive in these fields of commerce.40 These areas are
excluded from the scope of full harmonisation on the ground that the typical
complexity of transactions in these fields combined with the seriousness of
the risks to consumers may warrant more elaborate and detailed protections
for consumers. The new Directive also makes it clear that it does not apply to
national restrictions introduced for the purpose of protecting the health and
safety of consumers. Thus, to mention one area of controversy, rules govern-
ing tobacco advertising are not affected in so far as they are justified on the
ground of protecting the health and safety of consumers. 
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These derogations and exceptions from the scope of the Directive do not
really answer the criticisms of the uniform law that it may lead to a reduction
in protective standards in some countries with highly developed consumer
protection laws, and that it may discourage experimentation in new kinds of
protective measures for consumers against unfair commercial practices. The
latter criticism may turn out to be misplaced, however, given the breadth of
the general standard of good faith and the considerable flexibility granted to
Member States on modes of implementation and enforcement. Experimenta-
tion may continue either by exploring the possible meanings of good faith or
by devising new methods of securing compliance by traders with the general
standard. In particular, the reference to the reasonable expectations of con-
sumers in the general test of unfairness may enable courts and doctrinal wri-
ters to suggest new standards or criteria with which traders should be expect-
ed to comply.
Finally, it should be noted that the effect of maximal harmonisation is to place
considerable pressure on the legal system to draw a sharp distinction between
the field of application of the Directive, where no deviations are permitted,
and closely related but uncovered fields, where national law is either unaf-
fected or merely has to comply with minimum standards contained in other
European directives. In this context the concept of an unfair commercial
practice, considered above, will become a crucial determinant of the scope of
pre-emption by European law. Some commercial practices, though perhaps
regarded as unsavoury or undesirable, will not fall within the scope of the
directive because they may not distort consumers’ transactional decisions.
For example, regulations concerning taste and decency fall outside the scope
of the Directive. Other regulations governing commercial communications,
such as reports of companies to their investors and general promotions of a
brand image are also likely to fall outside the pre-empted field. In deter-
mining the field of application of the Directive, it is important to remember,
however, that it is not confined to cases concerning a trader’s conduct that
leads to a transaction; it encompasses unfair trading practices that occur out-
side any contractual relationship between a consumer and a trader. The Di-
rective also applies to certain aspects of the performance of contracts, as
where misleading statements are made with respect to a complaint mecha-
nism offered by the trader, or where the trader blocks an attempt by a con-
sumer to use a complaint mechanism.
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V. Information Duties
In theory, it is possible to make a sharp distinction between the regulation of
false or misleading statements and duties to provide or disclose information.
The former regulation controls the accuracy of information circulating in the
marketplace; the latter enhances the amount of information available in the
marketplace. The former regulation is generally regarded as necessary and de-
sirable: the circulation of false information obstructs competition in markets
and harms individual consumers who are the victims of fraud. But the latter
kind of regulation, which requires producers and traders to provide informa-
tion to their customers, is more controversial: in part because it imposes costs
on business; in part because some of that information may be regarded by the
business as confidential and commercially valuable; and in part because it is
unclear often whether the provision of additional information really helps
competition in markets or assists consumers to satisfy their preferences better
owing to problems of information overload and the difficulty of understand-
ing technical information. But the sharp distinction often drawn between
control over misleading statements and duties to provide information tends
to break down when we consider the proper scope of control over unfair
commercial practices.
The difficulty of drawing this distinction arises because traders may find it to
their commercial advantage to be ‘economical with the truth’. Nothing that is
actually said or written down by the seller is inaccurate, but the overall im-
pression given to the consumer is misleading, because some information that
reveals a weakness of the product or an additional cost is omitted. In order to
address this problem, Article 7(1) of the new directive introduces the concept
of a ‘misleading omission’ as an automatically unfair commercial practice.
A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking
into account of all its features and circumstances and the limitation of the communica-
tion medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according
to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely
to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have
taken otherwise.
This provision might apply for instance to the purchase of a house where the
estate agent omits to mention the government’s plan to build a large road at
the bottom of the garden. But that material omission is not necessarily an un-
fair commercial practice once the circumstances and the medium of commu-
nication is taken into account. That latter qualification seems to suggest that,
if the communication of the estate agent is given orally or perhaps in a docu-
ment that describes itself as a brief summary of the qualities of the property
for sale, the omission will not be regarded as material in all the circumstances.
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One response to the new Directive may therefore be an unwillingness on the
part of some traders to provide detailed written information for fear of mak-
ing a material omission, or in the alternative, to provide information but also
to state clearly that the document does not purport to be comprehensive and
does not provide information on certain material issues that would affect a
transactional decision. A difficult area in this respect is price labelling in
shops: the question is how much detail can be expected from a shop in its
price labelling of goods on the shelves when it offers a discount or some other
kind of promotion. 
An issue that is not clearly resolved by the Directive is whether it is necessary
to demonstrate that the trader itself knew of the omitted material information
and appreciated its importance to the transactional decision of the consumer.
Suppose in my example that the estate agent did not know of the govern-
ment’s plan, perhaps as a result of carelessness or incompetence. Would the
failure to disclose the information amount to an unfair commercial practice in
such circumstances? In other words, are honest or negligent omissions of ma-
terial information equally regarded as misleading commercial practices? Al-
though the Directive does not answer this question directly, it can perhaps be
inferred from the concept of ‘professional diligence’,41 which forms part of
the general test of unfairness, that at least careless omissions should be includ-
ed in this category of misleading omissions. A similar question about the ne-
cessary state of mind of the seller also arises in a related provision of Article
7(2) that describes as an unfair commercial practice the case where a trader
hides or provides in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely man-
ner the relevant material information.
In appreciating the scope of Article 7(1), it is also important to recall that a
transactional decision is defined in the Directive to include not only a con-
sumer’s decision whether or not to enter a contract, but also on what terms to
enter a transaction and whether or not to exercise a contractual right in rela-
tion to a product. Thus, for example, a seller who fails to point out to a dissat-
isfied consumer that under the terms of the contract the consumer is entitled
to compensation or to have the good replaced free of charge might be com-
mitting an unfair commercial practice under Article 7(1). Equally, a trader
who in fact provides that information but in small print that is hard for the
average consumer to understand may also be committing an unfair commer-
cial practice. 
Another difficult question for this provision regarding omissions is to deter-
mine what information is ‘material’ and therefore should have been disclosed
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or made available. Part of the answer must lie in the concept of a transactional
decision: the information is likely to classified as material if it would have
affected the transactional decision of the average consumer. In addition, the
Directive provides a list of certain types of information that will be regarded
as material in the case of an invitation to purchase.42 The trader must supply
that information unless it is apparent from the context.43 This duty to provide
information in the context of an invitation to purchase includes the main
characteristics of the product or service, the geographical address and the
identity of the business, the price inclusive of taxes and transport charges, the
arrangements for payment, delivery and complaint handling if they differ
from the normal standards of professional diligence, and the existence of any
right to cancellation or withdrawal. Furthermore, any other information
requirements established by Community law in relation to commercial com-
munications in general will also be regarded as material information that, if
omitted, would be regarded as an unfair commercial practice.44 In effect, this
provision turns all the prior information duties towards consumers enacted
by Community law into material information for the purpose of establishing
an unfair commercial practice. For example, the duties imposed on tour op-
erators to provide information concerning package holidays, such as the iti-
nerary, mode of transport, type and class of accommodation, meal plan, and
arrangements for payment, will all be regarded now as material information,
failure to disclose which is contrary to the implementing provisions of the
Package Travel Directive,45 will also be contrary to the new Directive as an
unfair commercial practice by comprising a misleading omission. 
In reviewing these comprehensive provisions regarding misleading omissions
and duties to supply information, it is worth making three further observa-
tions. First, although confined to consumer transactions, this general duty to
supply material information goes further than most, if not all, private law
systems in Europe in setting a high requirement of disclosure.46 It seems
likely to encourage the courts and doctrinal writers to assert broader duties
of disclosure in private law in order to permit consumers to escape from
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transactions into which they have entered as a result of an unfair commercial
practice. In steering this development, the new Directive introduces a novel
distinction between commercial practices that form part of an invitation to
purchase, and commercial practices that are merely aimed at influencing a
transactional decision. That distinction enables the legislation to insist upon
precise disclosure requirements that apply at the time of sale. The concept of
an invitation to purchase may provide the foundation for the evolution of
more intensive and precise duties of disclosure and good faith in pre-contrac-
tual negotiations. 
Second, with respect to the uniform standard or maximal harmonisation estab-
lished by the new Directive, it should be observed that where national laws
have implemented earlier Directives that permit more stringent standards, as
in the case of the Package Travel Directive, those additional national duties 
to provide information to the consumer will not be regarded as material
omissions for the purpose of establishing an unfair commercial practice. The
retention in national law of those additional duties to supply information will
only be permitted, however, under the test of proportionality described
above.47
Finally, it should be noted that there is an overlap between the concept of
misleading omissions contained in the new Directive and the duties of infor-
mation proposed in the draft Sales Promotion Regulation.48 A sales promo-
tion is a commercial communication designed to promote the goods, services,
or image of a business by means of offering discounts, free gifts (buy one, get
one free), a premium such as a voucher towards another product, or by offer-
ing a promotional contest or game. When making such sales promotions, the
proposed regulation describes in detail the information that must be supplied
by the promoter. In the case of the promotion by means of discounted prices,
for instance, the proposed regulation requires a trader to supply the exact
value of the discount, the reference price, and any limitations applicable to
the discount. The proposed Regulation is also intended to establish a uniform
law in order to reduce barriers to cross-border trade. There is no indication,
however, either in the new Directive or in the proposed Regulation of how
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these two legislative instruments will work together in areas of overlap. For
example, will the failure to provide the exact value of any discount amount to
an unfair commercial practice? Under the proposed regulation, the duty to
supply that information is an absolute one, whereas under the Directive there
is always the qualification that the omission of material information may be
excusable where that is justified by reasons of limitations of space and time
imposed by the communication medium used, or where that information
should have been apparent in the context.
VI. Credulous Consumers
The British government frequently issues the warning: ‘If it seems too good
to be true, it is’. Nevertheless, promises that seem too good to be true circu-
late in vast numbers, which suggests that at least a few consumers are seduced
by the various scams. Children, young people, the elderly and infirm may be
the most common victims of these kinds of rackets. When most consumers
receive a letter saying that they have won a vast prize in a competition that
they have not entered, they put it in the bin. But some will call the telephone
hotline at great expense, or send off the necessary payment to obtain their
prize. In short, whereas many misleading offers and statements will not
change the economic behaviour of the average consumer, they may affect a
credulous consumer.
The new Directive uses the average consumer as its principal test for whether
or not the commercial practice is unfair. Hence a hyperbolic statement about a
product that an average consumer would not treat seriously will not be caught
by the Directive’s prohibitions. But that focus on the average consumer, which
follows the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, is qualified in
three ways. First, the average consumer is defined as the average member of
the group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of con-
sumers.49 Thus when a commercial practice is directed towards the elderly and
infirm, the level of sophistication and credulity expected from the consumer
would be that of the average member of that group of consumers, not an aver-
age of the population as a whole. Second, where a commercial practice is of a
type that is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of an identifia-
ble group, such as children, because they are particularly vulnerable to the
practice or the product, again the fairness of the commercial practice should be
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however, the Directive reasserts that there are some exaggerated statements in
advertising that are not meant to be taken literally, and that no consumer, no
matter how credulous or naïve, should rely upon.51
VII. The Coherence of the Acquis Communautaire
The new Directive was always regarded as a type of framework Directive in
the sense that it would provide general standards to govern the wide range of
activities involving in advertising and marketing. It was hoped that the sheer
breadth of the Directive would assist in bringing coherence to the acquis
communautaire. Since the EC had already introduced a considerable amount
of legislation in this field, however, the question arose of how to bring the
whole body of law into systematic harmony. The general principle contained
in the Directive is that more specific legislation on particular issues will
exclude the general standards of the framework.
In the case of conflict between the provisions of this Directive and other Community
rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter shall prevail
and apply to those specific aspects.52
The effect of this provision is to leave in place prior Directives either when
they impose higher standards of consumer protection or lower standards.
In addition, the new Directive makes a few attempts to harmonise the law by
amending prior legislation. For instance, the Directive on misleading advertis-
ing is amended to exclude advertising directed towards consumers, so that its
purpose is now solely to protect other traders, and in particular to prevent
misleading, denigrating, comparative advertising.53 With respect to inertia sel-
ling, this is now a prohibited unfair commercial practice under the new
Directive,54 but the rules in the earlier directives on distance selling,55 which
prevent the consumer from incurring any private law obligations, such as an
obligation to pay for unsolicited goods, are re-enacted.56 It seems unlikely
that these few measures will have dealt with all the potential overlaps between
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Yet the most important issue with respect to the coherence of the acquis com-
munautaire concerns the question whether it is useful in the long run to draw
the sharp distinction contained in this Directive between business to con-
sumer transactions and business to business interactions. This distinction
may have more to do with the division of responsibilities within the Com-
mission than with the development of a coherent body of European law to
govern marketing. It is noteworthy in this context that the proposed Regula-
tion on Sales Promotions is not confined by reference to the need to protect
consumers. Arguments for regulating unfair commercial practices based
upon market failure and the need to promote a competitive market throu-
ghout Europe apply equally to business to business transactions. There is no
reason to suppose that a professional cannot be duped by misleading state-
ments or coerced by aggressive practices in some instances. Furthermore,
even if a case can be made for regarding the protection of consumers as a pri-
ority in Europe, as we have previously noted, any measure in this field of
commercial practices has an indirect impact on other traders by protecting
them from unfair competition from other businesses. Member States such as
Germany and Austria, where national laws adopt an approach that integrates
the protection of both entrepreneurs and consumers, objected to this exclu-
sive focus on consumers, and insisted that they would continue to adopt an
integrated approach in national law whilst conforming to the Directive.57
That move may create pressure to create a more coherent body of European
law with regard to unfair competitive practices that does not introduce the
artificial exclusive emphasis on consumer protection.
VIII. Conclusion
At a time when prospects for further measures of European integration look
rather poor following the defeat of the proposed Constitution, the new Di-
rective on unfair commercial practices amounts to a remarkable political
achievement. Despite vigorous opposition from some Member States on the
grounds that the law provided either too much or too little protection for
consumers, and also that in any case it was an unnecessary duplication of na-
tional laws, the Commission has succeeded in pushing through this flagship
legislation within its agenda of enhancing consumer confidence in the inter-
nal market. Perhaps a key ingredient in this success has been both a willing-
ness to produce a more detailed legislative text than is common with Euro-
ERCL 4/2005 439
57 Competitiveness Council, political agreement, Brussels, 25 May 2004, 9667/04, Annex
2, para 3.
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/21/14 1:19 PM
pean directives combined with a relatively clearly defined policy objective
that informs all the measures. 
Indeed, a general impression left after reading the new Directive is that it was
written by economists, using a theory of market failure, without much atten-
tion to prior law. It is replete with concepts that seem to be derived from text-
books on economics such as ‘material distortion of the economic behaviour
of consumers’, a ‘transactional decision’, and ‘invitation to purchase’. The Di-
rective seems to be relatively uninterested in issues that frequently concern
lawyers, such as the question whether the trader has to be proved to be at
fault in some sense, or how to construct the necessary enforcement mecha-
nisms. For instance, the Directive offers only meagre guidance on one impor-
tant practical issue concerning the burden of proof. When the legal issue is
whether or not the trader’s claims are factually accurate, the Directive sug-
gests that, where appropriate, national law may require the trader to provide
evidence of a statement’s accuracy.58 The Directive therefore does not endorse
a general requirement that the burden of proof should be placed on the trader
to demonstrate the truthfulness of claims, as one might expect in a Directive
aimed at consumer protection, but instead rather leaves the issue up in the air
by indicating that such a requirement may be imposed when ‘appropriate’ in
the circumstances of a particular case. National implementing legislation the-
refore enjoys a wide range of choice regarding how it constructs the burden
of proof save that it must leave open the possibility of placing the burden on
the trader in at least some instances of misleading statements. Nor has the Di-
rective really thought through the potential interaction between legislative
standards and codes of conduct, a matter of considerable interest for con-
sumer groups and lawyers. The development of transnational codes for speci-
fic sectors could provide the most reliable method for protecting consumers,
but the Commission does not appear to have pursued that option vigorously,
no doubt because it would be even harder to obtain than the new legislation.
Given this focus of the Directive on the economic problem to be addressed
rather than issues of legal process and doctrine, when national governments
have to implement this Directive through national legislation, they will have
to confront not only the usual task of translating European measures into
terms and concepts that will function satisfactorily within their national legal
systems, but also they will have to find ways of translating the economic con-
cepts into workable legal concepts. In so doing, we may observe the increas-
ing use of economic terminology throughout European private law systems:
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Yet this translation problem will certainly not prove to be the hardest aspect
of the task of national implementation legislation. The lazy route of simply
copying out the provisions of the Directive and enacting them as domestic
law will not work in this instance. The use of maximal harmonisation requi-
res national legislators to amend or eliminate inconsistent national laws that
occupy the same field as the Directive. Unless the national rules fall within
one of the derogations described above, any existing legislation that controls
unfair commercial practices will have to be revised so that it does not impose
additional duties on traders. Implementation of the Directive will require na-
tional authorities to review the entire corpus of their consumer protection
laws in order to eliminate possible conflicts.59 Although the general duty to
refrain from unfair commercial practices may not differ in substance from
particularistic, sector specific, national legislation, maximum harmonisation
will require the elimination of any more onerous or stringent requirements
imposed on traders. 
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